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Stability for South-Eastern Europe and the role of
development cooperation
Reconstruction and development are the keys to the
lasting stabilization of South-Eastern Europe. Develop-
ment cooperation will have an important role to play in
this. The World Bank believes the international commu-
nity faces a "Herculean task", while the head of the UN
Civil Administration in Kosovo, Tom Koenigs, fears it
will be a "Sisyphean task". The difficulties are mainly
due to Kosovo's political status still being unclear and
also to the large number of international actors and
institutions wanting to make their contribution to stabili-
zation.
 On 30 July 1999 the Sarajevo summit reaffirmed the
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, which had
been concluded on 10 June on the initiative of the Euro-
pean Union - and especially German foreign policy
 (see the box below). The intention underlying this ini-
tiative is that the Union's CFSP should play the leading
role in reconstruction in South-Eastern Europe, a role it
was unable to play in bringing peace to Kosovo or to
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 The Stability Pact aims "at strengthening countries in
South Eastern Europe in their efforts to foster peace,
democracy, respect for human rights and economic
prosperity, in order to achieve stability in the whole
region" (Article 9).
 The most important institution of the Stability Pact is the
South-Eastern Europe Regional Table chaired by Spe-
cial Coordinator Bodo Hombach (with its seat in Brus-
sels). The Regional Table oversees three Working Ta-
bles for (i) security questions, (ii) democratization and
human rights and (iii) economic reconstruction, eco-
nomic development and cooperation.
GDI GERMANDEVELOPMENT INSTITUTEBriefing Paper (5 / 1999)
Development Cooperation and Stability in South-Eastern Europe:
a Herculean or a Sisyphean Task?
Development cooperation will play an important role in the stabilization of South-Eastern Europe. Under the "Stability
Pact for South-Eastern Europe" German development cooperation faces the major challenge of contributing to the
EU's emerging common foreign and security policy (CFSP) - both bilaterally and through political representation in
multilateral institutions.
• In view of the large number of participants in the Stability Pact efficient donor coordination is needed. To this end,
new institutions have quickly been created, although their powers are not yet entirely clear. Coordination will work
only if the interest of all participants in the Stability Pact's success outweighs particularist interests. For the coordi-
nation of German development cooperation it will be crucially important (i) to reconcile the differing interests of
German actors and (ii) to ensure integration into a coherent reconstruction strategy coordinated by the EU and the
World Bank.
• The short-term objectives of development cooperation are emergency assistance, the restoration of basic infra-
structure, the provision of balance-of-payments support, and budgetary aid. Given the recipients', and especially
Kosovo's, limited borrowing capacity, such aid should take the form of non-refundable grants. For procurement
preference should be given to local supplies and services in order to strengthen self-help capacities and stimulate
the development of local economic potential.
• The medium-term objective of development cooperation is sustainable, self-perpetuating development in the region.
The foundations for this have to be laid through democratization, the development of the administration and legal
system, and the strengthening of the education system. Kosovo's development prospects are limited. This makes it all
the more important for reconstruction to stimulate the regional economy. German industry's commercial interests
should be subordinated to this objective. Concentration on a few, internationally agreed areas would increase the
efficiency of German development cooperation.
• The gravest problem for aid to South-Eastern Europe will be the poor absorptive capacity, i.e. an inadequate envi-
ronment for the appropriate use of funds. It is essential that aid commitments are geared not to calculated needs but
to the actual spending opportunities created by reforms. Politically motivated pressure to disburse funds should be
avoided because it would encourage corruption and mismanagement and reflect badly on the Stability Pact. An in-
novation would be country funds into which the donors each year paid resources that would not necessarily have to
be spent in the financial year concerned, but could be saved for a future use (accumulating country funds). This
would give the recipient countries an incentive to create an environment in which these resources can be put to
good use.
• In the long term the countries of South-Eastern Europe should have the prospect of acceding to the EU. Early ac-
cession, however, is not a realistic option for stabilization. It would hamper the development of competitive enter-
prises in the region and harm the EU's currently high standing in South-Eastern Europe. The aim should be rather
to make gradual integration possible by means of tailored stabilization and association agreements and to formu-
late the conditions for EU membership in more practical terms and so give South-Eastern Europe clear and reliable
signs of what is needed.
2 Moreover, a joint EU-World Bank coordination
mechanism was adopted for South-Eastern Europe at
the G7's spring meeting with the international financial
institutions (IFIs). Coordination is achieved through a
joint office in Brussels and at meetings of a High-Level
Steering Group (G7 finance ministers and IFIs).
 Reconstruction in Kosovo occurs under the aegis of the
UN Mission (UNMIK) headed by Bernard Kouchner. It
covers the four civil areas of (i) development of the
administration (lead agency: UN), (ii) return of refugees
(UNHCR), (iii) democratic development (OSCE) and
(iv) economic reconstruction (EU).
 The EU has dispatched a Task Force (TAFKO) to Ko-
sovo. Its functions will later be taken over by the new
European Agency for Reconstruction (which will
have its seat in Thessaloniki and its operating unit in
Prishtina). The European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) and the European Investment
Bank (EIB) are preparing for an extensive commitment
to South-Eastern Europe.
 The Federal Republic of Germany is planning to appoint
a representative for Kosovo. Its Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) has set up a
Working Group on the Reconstruction of South-Eastern
Europe (AWS) consisting of representatives of the Ger-
man development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
(KfW), the German Agency for Technical Cooperation
(GTZ) and the German Finance Company for Invest-
ments in Developing Countries (DEG). The Working
Group has an office in Prizren (GORED), where a Ger-
man Foreign Office coordination staff unit for recon-
struction in Kosovo also operates.
 Given the large number of institutions involved, donor
coordination will work only if the interest of all partici-
pants in seeing the whole Stability Pact succeed out-
weighs any particularist interests.
 The coordination of German development cooperation
must ensure two things in particular: (i) a balance of the
individual interests of the government departments and
implementing organizations involved, a lesson learnt
from the TRANSFORM programme for central and
Eastern Europe, and (ii) the integration of the German
development cooperation contribution into a coherent
reconstruction strategy agreed at the upper levels of
coordination.
 Direct and indirect war damage in the countries of
South-Eastern Europe
The countries of South-Eastern Europe (see the box on
page 3) have been affected by the war to different de-
grees. A distinction can be made between countries that
have suffered direct war damage (mainly the Serbian
part of Yugoslavia and Kosovo) and the neighbouring
countries, which have suffered indirectly (Albania, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia and
Romania).
Direct war damage is largely confined to Yugoslavia.
NATO bombed communications, energy supply and
industrial facilities. In Kosovo damage to infrastructure
was accompanied by the extensive destruction of rural
and urban life support systems (farms, housing) due to
ethnic cleansing. Some of the area is mined.
Indirect war damage takes the following forms:
− Costs for refugees: Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia
and Herzegovina were and remain the main recipient
countries for Kosovar refugees, many of whom have
returned to Kosovo by now.
− Slump in trade, tourism and transport: Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Macedonia have lost most of their
Yugoslav export market. Croatia's reviving tourist
industry has again suffered. Romania and Bulgaria
have been forced to use new, more costly transit
routes for their foreign trade.
− Loss of confidence by foreign investors: The re-
newed instability in South-Eastern Europe has
frightened off foreign direct investors and increased
the risk premiums for the region's financing instru-
ments in the international capital markets.
− Suspension of structural reforms: Owing to the fi-
nancial burdens, some governments in South-Eastern
Europe are likely to have difficulty pressing ahead
with the reform measures that are needed.
 Indirect damage is expected to result in losses of growth
in Yugoslavia's neighbours, with Bosnia and Herzego-
vina and Macedonia hardest hit, followed by Bulgaria
and Croatia.
 Short-term objectives: alleviating the consequences
of war and restoring the basic infrastructure
 In the next few months the international community
must address four priority areas:
− care of refugees and returnees;
− restoration of local basic infrastructure (housing,
municipal services and utilities, agriculture);
− development of administrative structures;
− alleviation of the indirect consequences of war with
balance-of-payments and budgetary aid.
 Whenever possible, these measures should take the form
of non-refundable grants so as not to increase the
recipient countries' debt burden.
 For procurement preference should be given to local
supplies and services. This will strengthen self-help
capacities and stimulate the development of local eco-
nomic potential.
 Participants in the Stability Pact:
− the EU Member States, the European Commission
and the European Council,
− the countries of South-Eastern Europe, with the
exception of Yugoslavia, viz. Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Slove-
nia, Macedonia and Hungary,
− the USA, Japan and Canada,
− the Russian Federation,
− Turkey,
− the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE),
− the UN and its relief agency for refugees (UN-
HCR),
− NATO and the Western European Union (WEU),
− IMF, World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (EBRD), and European In-
vestment Bank (EIB),
− OECD,
− various initiatives for cooperation and integration
in South-Eastern Europe.
3 Medium-term objectives: transformation and sus-
tainable development
 The medium-term goal is sustainable, self-perpetu-
ating development in South-Eastern Europe through the
reconstruction of the industrial infrastructure and eco-
nomic transformation. It does not differ fundamentally
from the objectives pursued with the donor programmes
in support of transformation that have been in operation
since the early 1990s.
 Economic success will be possible only if the following
requirements are also satisfied:
− democratization with a view to replacing corruption
with transparent and equal opportunities for every-
one and promoting the integration of society;
− an efficient administration that is willing to reform
and creates a business-friendly environment includ-
ing a simple, transparent tax system;
− an efficient legal system that protects property rights
and so makes foreign direct investment attractive;
− a modern education system that teaches the skills
needed in an industrial and service economy.
 Of particular interest are prospects for the develop-
ment of Kosovo, which was the poorest part of Yugo-
slavia even before the war. Much of the population was
engaged in small-scale and subsistence farming. The
energy sector (brown coal production and hydroelec-
tricity, largely for supply to other parts of the country)
and the mining of non-ferrous metals in the northern part
of the country have given rise to some "industrial is-
lands", which do not, however, offer much scope for
development. With the political issues unsettled, the
potential for direct investment will remain limited for
the time being. Kosovo's borrowing capacity must there-
fore be rated extremely low.
 It is therefore all the more important for the medium-
term strategy to be so formulated that it has employ-
ment and income effects in the region. In Bosnia and
Herzegovina the reconstruction work financed by donors
has become the country's main engine of growth - al-
though it has yet to generate any self-sustaining growth.
As with emergency aid, local supplies and services
should be preferred to turn-key supplies from the donor
countries so as to encourage the local economy.
 Conflicts with German industry's interest in supplying
goods and services may occur in this area. Development
cooperation must give clear priority to the foreign
policy objective of stabilizing regional development. It
would be at its most efficient if it participated in the
sectoral programmes coordinated at EU/World Bank
level. Concentration on a few focal areas is advisable
in this context.
 Financing needs and absorptive capacity
 There is as yet no final assessment of the resources that
will be needed for reconstruction in South-Eastern
Europe. So far the total reconstruction aid require-
ment has been estimated at US$ 30 to 100bn over a 10-
year period.
 In May 1999 the IMF calculated the following provi-
sional financing needs for Kosovo's six most affected
neighbours (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Macedonia and Romania):
− US$ 400 to 760m in humanitarian assistance;
− US$ 1.1 to 1.7bn in balance-of-payments aid;
− US$ 530 to 750m in budgetary aid.
The figures being mentioned for Kosovo are around
US$ 3.5 to 5bn, which would have to be raised primarily
by bilateral donors and the EU. Kosovo cannot be allo-
cated any IMF or World Bank credits for the time being
because Yugoslavia is no longer a member of these
institutions. The World Bank, however, has paid US$
60m in grants from its net profit into a trust fund for the
next 18 months. The fund is intended to cover the wages
and salaries of the employees of Kosovo's administra-
tion and public services.
The first international donor conference on 28 July 1999
pledged aid of initially US$ 2.2bn for Kosovo. The
largest shares of this will be provided by the US (US$
557m) and the EU (US$ 534m). The EU has announced
its willingness to provide Euro 500m for the next four
years.
Some donors are now correcting their estimates of fi-
nancing needs downwards. The outgoing EU Commis-
sioner for economic and financial policy has said that
the destruction in Kosovo is probably less than assumed.
The EBRD points out that rapid reconstruction is
hardly possible because of the lack of partners and
industrial structures.
Even if these statements conceal a desire to save, the
main dilemma for reconstruction aid remains the
same: aid to Eastern Europe in the past has been suc-
cessful only where there has been a local willingness
and appropriate institutional capacities to undertake
reforms. Currently, Romania, for example, is having
 Unequal development in South-Eastern Europe
 [EBRD reform ranking of countries in transition; per
capita income in 1998]
 Hungary [Rank 1; US$ 4,727] and Slovenia [Rank 6,
US$ 9,826] are the most advanced countries in the
region and are negotiating with the EU on their acces-
sion.
 Bulgaria [Rank 12; US$ 1,700] and Romania [Rank
16; US$ 1,697] have not achieved this objective be-
cause of shortcomings in their economic reforms and
will probably be candidates for the subsequent en-
largement of the EU.
 Croatia [Rank 9; US$ 4,477] and Macedonia [Rank
13; US$ 1,663 (1997)] have advanced only slightly
further than Bulgaria and Romania.
 Albania [Rank 19; US$ 952] is the poorest country in
the region; after a period in which it was in danger of
disintegrating, it has achieved no more than makeshift
consolidation.
 Bosnia and Herzegovina [Rank 23; US$ 972] can be
called a "state" only as defined by the criteria of inter-
national law. In fact, the international administration
forms no more than a tether around the Serbian and
Muslim-Croat parts of the country, which continue to
drift apart.
 Yugoslavia [not included; US$ 1,240] has lost the
former republics of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. It isolated itself politically and economi-
cally at international level by resorting to ethnic
"cleansing", first during the wars with Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina, then in Kosovo. It will re-
main excluded from reconstruction aid for the foresee-
able future. The Republic of Montenegro is pressing
for a more independent role.
 Kosovo is even poorer than Albania. Its future status
in the Yugoslav federation is unclear. At present the
most important sovereign functions are being per-
formed by an interim UN administration (UNMIK) and
an international military security presence (KFOR).
4problems meeting the conditions attached to the IMF
and World Bank credits it was allocated before the re-
construction programme. Although additional lending
commitments may bridge any bottlenecks that emerge in
the short term, they are no substitute for reform efforts
by the countries of South-Eastern Europe themselves.
Bosnia and Herzegovina makes it particularly clear that
the capacity for absorbing aid in a chaotic political envi-
ronment is limited. It is therefore essential that aid
commitments be geared not to calculated needs but to
actual spending opportunities created by reforms and
that this view be put forward in public.
It is at all events important that donors should avoid any
politically motivated pressure to disburse resources.
Headlines about rapid, but inadequately monitored aid
to South-Eastern Europe encouraging corruption and
rent-seeking would do irreparable damage to the Stabil-
ity Pact.
An innovation would be country funds into which the
donors each year paid resources that would not neces-
sarily have to be spent in the financial year concerned,
but could be saved for a future use (accumulating
country funds). This would give the recipient countries
an incentive to create an environment in which these
resources can be put to good use.
Prospects for the South-Eastward enlargement
of the EU
In recent weeks there has been a growing debate about
the promotion of stability in South-Eastern Europe by
accelerating accession to the EU. The hope associated
with this is that the EU's stability will spread to the re-
gion.
Politicians committed to reforms will undoubtedly find
local support in a clear and reliable prospect of EU
membership for their countries. Precipitate accession,
however, will benefit neither the countries of South-
Eastern Europe nor the EU. None of the countries of
South-Eastern Europe yet satisfies the five Copenhagen
criteria for accession:
(i) democracy and the rule of law;
(ii) market economy;
(iii) competitiveness in the internal European market;
(iv) adoption of the acquis communautaire and agree-
ment with the goals of political union and eco-
nomic and monetary union;
(v) the EU's capacity to absorb new members while
maintaining the momentum of EU integration.
Some countries of South-Eastern Europe and Kosovo
still have shortcomings as regards the democracy and
rule of law criterion, and the question is whether early
EU membership would lead to positive adjustment in
these countries or to a relaxation of EU standards. It
makes sense, however, to expand development coopera-
tion programmes under which legislation in South-
Eastern Europe is already being aligned with EU law.
The main problems are the market economy and com-
petitiveness. An early entry into the internal EU market
would give these economies a violent shock and so
jeopardize the hoped-for revival of the regional econ-
omy. The EU had good reason not to include Bulgaria
and Romania among the candidates in the first round of
accession negotiations. Conditions have since only
slightly improved.
In the short term all that matters is to show what condi-
tions countries of South-Eastern Europe have to satisfy
in the interests of both sides if they are to accede to the
EU. Speculation about early accession awakens in these
countries expectations that are based not on a sober
analysis of costs and benefits but on rather vague hopes
of prosperity. As early accession would entail substan-
tial adjustment costs, the EU could hardly help but see
its standing decline in South-Eastern Europe - especially
as there are no funds for generous transfer payments.
Reviving the regional linkages would be wise, given the
proximity of the markets and similar quality standards,
and might be promoted by the EU's development coop-
eration programmes. As at the time of the Soviet Union's
collapse, however, it is not economic considerations but
political factors geared to division rather than regional
integration that now determine what action is to be taken
in the region. However, the countries of South-Eastern
Europe are already gearing their trade closely to the EU.
The realistic prospect is therefore one of enabling the
gradual convergence of individual sectors by means of
tailor-made stability and association agreements. Non-
reciprocal trade concessions would then have to be
granted for a transitional period. The EU agricultural
markets in particular would have to be opened quickly
to small regional economies such as Kosovo. Con-
versely, regional agriculture in South-Eastern Europe
should be protected in the near future.
Andreas Wittkowsky
Additional readings
World Bank / European Commission (1999): Eco-
nomic Reconstruction and Development in South East
Europe (regularly updated information available at
http://www.seerecon.org)
Wittkowsky, A. (1999): Transition, Governance, and
Aid – The Dilemma of Western Assistance to Slowly
Transforming Countries, GDI, Berlin (forthcoming)
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